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FROM NUREMBERG




In the early 1990s, five decades after Nuremberg, the United Na-
tions set up two ad hoc war crimes tribunals.' In 1998, the U.N. went fur-
ther, and adopted the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court.
2
The Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals were the first such panels.3 The
United Nations stated that the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals were de-
* Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo Law School; Direc-
tor, Human Rights Center at SUNY Buffalo. This essay is based on a talk the
author gave in December 1997 at the conference on Peace and Human Rights in the
Great Lakes Region of Africa at Makerere University in Kampala, Uganda.
In 1993 the Security Council of the United Nations established on an ad hoc
basis the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Seri-
ous Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia Since 1991 (hereinafter Yugoslav Tribunal). See S.C. Res. 808, U.N.
SCOR, 3175th mtg. U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993); S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR,
3217 mtg. U.N. S/RES/827 (1993); REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL PURSU-
ANT TO 2 OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 808, U.N. Doc. S/25704, Annex
(1993) (containing text of the statute of the Yugoslav Tribunal). For an exhaustive
analysis and documentation of the Yugoslav Tribunal, see M. Cherif Bassiouni &
Peter Manikas, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (1996). In the case of Rwanda, the Security Council of the
United Nations established on November 8, 1994, the International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and
Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed
in the Territory of Neighboring States, Between 1 January 1994 and 31 December
1994 (hereinafter Rwanda Tribunal). See United Nations Security Council, Report
of the Secretary General Pursuant to [ 5 of Security Council Resolution 955, U.N.
Doc. S/1995/134 (1994).
2 Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc.A/Conf.183/9
(1998) (visited Apr. 21, 2000) <http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/contents.htm>.
3 The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (hereinafter Nuremberg Tri-
bunal) was established in 1946 by the Charter of the International Military Tribunal
for the Far East at Tokyo, Jan. 19, 1946 (amended Apr. 26, 1946), T.I.A.S. No.
1589, 4 Bevans 20; Charter dated January 19, 1946, reprinted in 4 Treaties and
Other Agreements of the United States of America 27 (1946); Amended Charter
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signed to "put an end" to serious crimes such as genocide and to "take
effective measures to bring to justice the persons who are responsible for
them."4 This essay argues that, at least with regard to the Rwanda tribunal,
both assumptions are deeply flawed; such a tribunal will have little, if any,
effect on human rights violations of such enormous barbarity. Moreover,
the essay questions the motives behind the creation of the Rwanda tribunal
and argues that the tribunal serves to deflect responsibility, to assuage the
consciences of states which were unwilling to stop the genocide, or to legit-
imize the Tutsi regime of Paul Kagame, Rwanda's strongman. It contends,
in any case, that from the start the tribunal was intended to achieve neither
the abolitionist impulses nor the just ends trumpeted by the United Nations.
The essay argues that the tribunal is marginal, if not entirely irrelevant, to
the political, reconstructionist, and "peace" and "normalization" processes
underway in Rwanda. In the event, the Rwanda tribunal largely masks the
illegitimacy of the Tutsi regime and allows Tutsis a moral plane from which
to exact their revenge on the Hutus. The article concludes that such a tribu-
nal would only make sense in the context of an overall solution, a compre-
dated April 26, 1946, T.I.A.S. no. 1589, reprinted in 4 Treaties and Other Interna-
tional Agreements of the United States of America 27 (1946).
4 See S.C. Res. 827, supra note 1, at 1. The Security Council expressed its belief
that the creation of the Yugoslav Tribunal for the "[p]rosecution of persons respon-
sible for the above-mentioned violations [mass killings, massive and systematic
detention, killings, and rape of women, and 'ethnic cleansing'] of international hu-
manitarian law will contribute to ensuring that such violations are halted and effec-
tively redressed." Id., atl. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was
established after the commission of experts formed by the Security Council to in-
vestigate violations in that civil war recommended such a tribunal. S. C. Res. 955,
U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994). The Rwanda
Tribunal was created with some ties to the Yugoslav Tribunal. S.C. Res. 955, U.N.
SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., Annex, Art. 12(2), U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994)
(adopting and annexing the tribunal statute). The members of the Appeals Cham-
ber and the Prosecutor of the Yugoslav Tribunal serve the same functions for the
Rwanda Tribunal. See also, Payam Akhavan, "Enforcement of the Genocide Con-
vention: A Challenge to Civilization," 8 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 229, 240-241. The
Security Council resolutions establishing the Yugoslav and Rwanda tribunals were
binding on states because they were taken under Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter. The deployment of Chapter VII of the UN Charter was preferable to the
creation of such tribunals by treaty because it "[wiould have the advantage of being
expeditious and of being immediately effective as all states would be under a bind-
ing obligation to take whatever action is required to carry out a decision taken as an
enforcement measure under Chapter VU." See Report of the Secretary General,
supra note 1, IN 22-23.
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hensive and bold settlement addressing the foundational problems that
unleashed the genocide in the first place.5 As it is, the tribunal now orbits
in space, suspended from political reality and removed from both the indi-
vidual and national psyches of the victims as well as the victors in the
Rwanda conflict.
II. HYPocRISY AND THE LEGACY OF NUREMBERG
Nuremberg was a patchwork of political convenience, the arro-
gance of military victory over defeat, and the ascendancy of American, An-
glo-Saxon hegemony over the globe. Telford Taylor, the chief deputy
prosecutor in the American team at Nuremberg, provides a partial silhouette
of this construction:
The initial pressure for post war trials came from the peo-
ples of the German-occupied nations, but the assemblage of
all the concepts in a single package was the work of a hand-
ful of American lawyers, all but Cutter (who was from Bos-
ton) from New York city. Some of them (Stimson,
McCloy) were what today we call "moderate" Republicans;
several (Rosenman, Chanler, Herbert Wechsler) were Dem-
ocrats. Elitist and generally accustomed to personal pros-
perity, all had strong feelings of noblesse oblige.
6
As noted by Anderson, "Nuremberg was fundamentally an expres-
sion of a peculiarly American legal sensibility ' 7 beginning with the fact that
although many in the German-occupied lands wanted the trials, it was the
Americans who pushed for them and brought along the skeptical British.8
The other two powers, the French and the Soviets, were merely ornamental:
they were "brought in later, in order to complete the 'Allies"'. 9 Thus, Nu-
remberg can be seen as an orchestrated and highly manipulated forum in-
5 For a good discussion about the place of judicial intervention in genocidal con-
flicts, see Jose E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons of Rwanda, 24
YALE J. INT'L L. 365 (1999).
6 Telford Taylor, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 41 (1992). Taylor
himself was a graduate of Harvard Law School who had held senior appointments
within the legal profession. Id.
I Kenneth Anderson, Nuremberg Sensibility: Telford Taylor's Memoir of the Nu-
remberg Trials, 7 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 281, 289 (1994) (reviewing TELFORD TAY-
LOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALs (1992)).
8 Id. at 289.
9 Id. The Tokyo Tribunal, which tried Japanese civil and military leaders for
waging a war of aggression, was a naked American affair. It was dominated by
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tended primarily to impress on the Nazi leadership who the victors were
and to discredit them as individuals as well as their particular brand of the
philosophy of racial supremacy. The irony of Nuremberg, and the White
men who created it was that their states either practiced as official policy or
condoned their own versions of racial mythologies: Britain and France vio-
lently put down demands for independence in "their" colonies in Africa and
Asia while the United States denied its citizens of African descent basic
human rights.
It is not surprising therefore that Nuremberg did not demonize the
German people as a whole, although many Germans participated in, acqui-
esced to, and supported the Holocaust and the countless horrible abomina-
tions of the Third Reich. It mattered to the Allies that Germany be recast,
shorn of its ability to make aggressive war, because the West needed it in
the reconstruction of Europe. This purpose would have been difficult to
accomplish had the trials satanized the German people as a whole and
painted the evils they committed as symptomatic of a national, genetic
pathology.
The paltry numbers of those tried and convicted at Nuremberg -
twenty-two indictments and nineteen convictions - made a mockery of
criminal liability for the massive killings, torture, and other barbarities com-
mitted by the Nazis.10 Even the number of the estimated 3,000 trials of war
criminals in the national courts of other Allied powers utilizing interna-
tional law and the norms employed by the Nuremberg Tribunal is too small
for such widespread offenses.'" Prosecution was thus selective and the cre-
ation of applicable law inventive, if not convenient. The concepts of indi-
vidual responsibility for international crimes was a departure, an
innovation, from existing customary or treaty law, as were the notions of
crimes against peace and crimes against humanity.1 2 Chief Justice Harlan
Fiske Stone attacked the Nuremberg trials in a most searing language:
So far as the Nuremberg trial is an attempt to justify the
application of the power of the victor to the vanquished be-
cause the vanquished made aggressive war .... I dislike
American judges, prosecutors, and attorneys. See INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
WORLD ORDER 170 (Bums H. Weston et al. eds., 2d ed. 1990).
10 For a tabulation of the counts, indictments, and convictions at Nuremberg, see
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER, supra note 9, at 168-69.
11 Id. at 171.
12 INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTs IN CONTExT: LAW, PoLrlcs, MORALS 100-02
(Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston eds., 1996); see also, Francis Biddle, The Nurn-
berg Trial, 33 VA. L. REV. 679, 694 (1947).
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extremely to see it dressed up with a false facade of legal-
ity. The best that can be said is that for it is that it is a
political act of the victorious States which may be morally
right .... It would not disturb me greatly .... if that power
were openly and frankly used to punish the German leaders
for being a bad lot, but it disturbs me some to have it
dressed up in the habiliments of the common law and the
Constitutional safeguards to those charged with crime.
Jackson [Robert H. Jackson, Associate Justice of the Su-
preme Court of the United States, chief prosecutor at Nu-
remberg] is away conducting his high-grade lynching party
in Nuremberg .... I don't mind what he does to the Nazis,
but I hate to see the pretense that he is running a court and
proceeding according to common law. This is a little too
sanctimonious a fraud to meet my old-fashioned ideas.1 3
While the Allies found no problem with extending the reach of in-
ternational law to cover the actions of the Nazis, they took great care to
exclude from the jurisdiction of the Nuremberg Tribunal their own conduct
which did not then constitute the violation of international customary or
treaty law but which was nevertheless horrendous, such as the massive
bombing of cities with extremely high civilian casualties. 14 The Tokyo Tri-
bunal was even more blatant in excluding the culpable acts of the Allies. It
forbade any attempt by the lawyers for the Japanese defendants to argue the
defence of tu quoque, which would have estopped the Allies from prosecut-
ing the enemy for acts the Allies committed themselves. 15 According to a
judge at the Tokyo Tribunal, the judges feared that allowing the defence of
tu quoque would have opened the door to defence arguments about the
American fire-bombing of Tokyo, which killed 72,000, and the nuclear
bombardment of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 16
The lessons of Nuremberg for both the Yugoslav and Rwanda
Tribunals are disturbing to say the least. Even though Germany was com-
pletely defeated and occupied, allowing the Allies access to most of the
offenders and substantial evidence, the prosecutions were sharply limited to
"major war criminals." Political expediency and the West's desire to get on
13 ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FisKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 715-16
(1956).
14 See Steiner & Alston, supra note 12, at 102.
15 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER , supra note 9, at 7.
16 Id. at 170; See particularly B.V.A. ROLING, THE TOKYO TRiAL AND BEYOND:
REFLECTIONS OF A PEACEMONGER (Antonio Cassese ed., 1993).
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with the reconstruction of Europe and Germany appeared to have militated
against the prosecution of more offenders. It is considerably more difficult
to try any suspects - major or minor - where the conflict is inconclusive,
without clear victors and losers, or where there are political and logistical
difficulties in apprehending suspects. Despite its contribution to the inter-
national criminalization of internal atrocities, Nuremberg serves as the
model of the triumph of convenience over principle, the subordination of
justice to politics, and the arrogance of might over morality. Nuremberg
gave future generations a basis for talking about accountability for the most
horrible crimes; but it also emphasized the cynicism of power.
III. SHAME IN THE CREATION OF THE RWANDA TRIBUNAL
It is difficult not see the creation of the Rwanda Tribunal as a cyni-
cal exercise by major powers. The events that led to its establishment were
not dissimilar to those that caused the creation of the Yugoslav Tribunal.
Rwanda went up in flames in April 1994 after President Juvenal Haby-
arimana, a Hutu, was killed in a mysterious plane crash while returning
from neighboring Tanzania where he was negotiating a settlement to his
country's civil war. In 1994 the Tutsi-dominated Rwanda Patriotic Front
(RPF), which had been at war with the government since 1990, demanding
the return of Tutsi exiles and the introduction of democracy, took power
after a genocidal conflagration in which about 500,000 Tutsis were report-
edly killed by Hutu government forces and militia.
7
If the former Yugoslavia suffered from international inaction, the
world seemed asleep, uncaring, as ominous clouds gathered over Rwanda,
igniting a murderous inferno as they touched the ground. Rwanda was fur-
ther punished for the failures of the international community in the Somali
debacle, and the resultant big power "fatigue" from that crisis.' 8 Partly due
to that experience, and American marginalization of Africa, the United
States refrained from intervening or pushing for effective international ac-
17 Human Rights Watch Africa, Genocide in Rwanda: April-May 1994, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH AFR., May 1994, at 2; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT
1995 39-48 (1994).
18 For the failures of United States and UN efforts in Somalia see Hussein H.
Adam, Somalia: A Terrible Beauty Being Born, in COLLAPSED STATES: THE DISIN-
TEGRATION AND RESTORATION OF LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY 69-89 (William I.
Zartman, ed. 1995); Michael Begg, UN Withdrawal From Somalia, IRISH TIMES,
March 15, 1995, at 15.
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tion to stop the genocide in Rwanda.19 American racist stereotypes of "Af-
rican conflicts" became the pretext for passivity as a top American official
forbade the use of the term genocide to describe the Rwandan holocaust.
20
Thus the United States entered the region after the RFP had emerged victo-
rious, and then only with the express mandate of airlifting supplies to refu-
gee camps in Zaire where at least one million Hutus had fled.
2'
United Nations inactivity and acquiescence to genocide was equally
damning. There were credible reports that the United Nations peace-keep-
ing force in Rwanda (UNAMIR), which had been present to facilitate the
peace negotiations between the Hutu government and the RPF, apparently
knew that a genocide might take place but the UN took no preventive ac-
tion.22 The April 1994 withdrawal by Belgium of its 400 UNAMIR contin-
gent and the failure of the remaining UNAMIR forces to intervene allowed
Hutu leaders to unleash genocidal massacres against Tutsis and moderate
Hutus.23 Later attempts by the UN to intervene were too little and too late.
19 See generally, PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM You THAT To-
MORROW WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES (1998). See also, Joyce Price,
Why Rwanda Was Ignored, WASHINGTON TIMES, July 31, 1994, at A4.
20 As powerfully put by Human Rights Watch:
Certain White House officials counseled that military interven-
tion would be useless because they believed that the war resulted
from deeply rooted "tribal hatreds" which, "because they had al-
ways existed," would continue forever. A few weeks after the
massacres had begun, when it had long been evident that geno-
cide was taking place, a senior member of the Clinton administra-
tion ordered officials not to speak of "genocide" because the term
could increase the moral pressure on the President and force him
to act. See World Report, supra note 17, at 46.
Even if one could grant part of the argument that the tensions between Hutus and
Tutsis were in a sense historical, one could still not justify inaction on that basis. If
that were a valid premise for viewing conflicts with racial, ethnic, or religious
dimensions, it would be senseless to expend resources on peace efforts between
Arabs and Jews in the Middle East or Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland.
That is why such views and policies must be exposed for what they truly are: racist
excuses for inaction.
21 See, Craig Nelson, Rwanda: US Keen to Prove its Concern Over Refugees
Plight," INDEPENDENT (London), August 1, 1994, at 9.
22 See, World Report 1995, supra note 17, at 41.
23 Id. Human Rights watch has painted the picture of a highly culpable UN and
international community:
[F]ollowing the plane crash [carrying President Habyarimana],
the beginning of the massacres, and the resumption of civil war,
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As put by Human Rights Watch, "Shamefully absent at the moment of the
killings, the international community is now moving slowly [by establish-
ing the Rwanda Tribunal] to bring those guilty to justice.
' '24
The RPF government, which should have welcomed the Rwanda
tribunal instead opposed it, in part because of the unwillingness of the inter-
national community to stop the genocide and the fear that such a tribunal
would preempt its own authority to stage war crimes trials. 25 Manzi
Bakuramutsa, the RPF envoy to the Security Council, which cast the only
dissenting vote on the creation of Rwanda Tribunal,2 6 objected to it on the
following grounds: the tribunal would not address crimes committed be-
tween October 1, 1990, when the war started, and July 17, 1994, instead of
only the 1994 calendar year; the tribunal would likely sit outside Rwanda;
the tribunal would not have the authority to impose the death penalty;
judges from certain states which were involved in the war would be biased;
and that those convicted would serve their sentences in countries offering
the UN and the US initially reacted with retreat, confusion, and
lethargy. This apparent indifference, combined with the lack of
any reaction by the international community to the massacres in
Burundi in October and November 1993, made the Rwandan
Hutu extremists think that they could kill with impunity. Id.,at
45; see also Rwanda: A New Catastrophe, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH/AFRICA (Human Rts. Watch Africa, New York, N.Y)
Dec. 1994.
24 Id. at 45.
25 Distrustful of the international community's ambivalence towards the killings
of Tutsis, the RFP government sought to try suspected war criminals itself, and thus
opposed the Rwanda Tribunal. As put by the Rwandese representative to the UN
Security Council:
When the genocide began, the international community, which
had troops in Rwanda and could have saved hundreds of
thousands of human lives by, for example, establishing humanita-
rian safe zones, decided instead to withdraw its troops from
Rwanda and to abandon the victims to their butchers. See U.N.
SCOR, 49th Sess. 3453rd mtg., at 14, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453
(1994).
26 The vote for the creation of the Rwanda Tribunal in the 15-member Security
Council was 13 in favor, one (Rwanda) against, with China abstaining. China ab-
stained because it felt that it was not a "cautious act to vote in a hurry on the draft
resolution and statute [establishing the Rwanda Tribunal] that the Rwandan govern-
ment still finds difficult to accept." See Anthony Goodman, UN Establishes
Rwanda Genocide Tribunal, Reuters, November 8, 1994, available in LEXIS,
News Library, ARCNWS File.
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prison facilities, instead of Rwandan jails.27 The Rwandan delegate con-
cluded that a "tribunal as ineffective as this would only appease the con-
science of the international community rather than respond to the
expectations of the Rwandese people. ' 28 Rwanda claimed that the absence
of the death penalty against those guilty of genocide was the primary reason
for its opposition to the tribunal.
29
The establishment of the "other" tribunal, the Rwanda Tribunal,
was possible because the Yugoslav Tribunal had set a precedent for such
action by the international community. The UN and the powerful states that
control it could not reject a tribunal for Rwanda when they had set one up
for the former Yugoslavia; formally, white European lives were put on the
same footing with black African lives. The overlapping conflicts, which
had been so brutal and barbaric, had taken place in front of the television
camera, making it impossible to set up a process for prosecuting one group
of perpetrators and not the other. Nevertheless, the Rwanda Tribunal was
an afterthought, a fact underscored by its grafting to the Yugoslav Tribunal.
The Rwanda Tribunal was in effect a sideshow to the Yugoslav Tribunal;
the Prosecutor for both tribunals was resident at The Hague as were the
members of the Appeals Chamber. The international press and the United
Nations were pre-occupied with the Yugoslav Tribunal and only seemed to
give the most perfunctory attention to the Rwanda Tribunal. In the circum-
stances, it is not difficult to conclude that big power cynicism deflated the
seriousness of the notion of international rule of law, an essential civiliza-
tional norm for a diverse world.
IV. AsSESSING THE RWANDA TRIBUNAL
Some leading international scholars see the mere establishment of
the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals as a very significant event in the de-
velopment of the enforcement of international criminal and humanitarian
27 Id.; see also Rwanda: Urgent, Agence France Presse, November 8, 1994, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File. For a more comprehensive look at
the Rwanda's objections, see Payam Akhavan, The International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda: the Politics and Pragmatics of Punishment, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 501,
504-08 (1996).
28 Id.
29 Philippe Naughton, Rwandan Minister Defends "No" Vote on Tribunal,
Reuters World Service, Nov. 9, 1994, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library,
ARCNWS File. Alphonse Nkubito, the Rwandan Minister of Justice emphasized
that those guilty of genocide must suffer the death penalty since it was part of
Rwandan law. He cited public pressure among the Rwandese for the death penalty
as the primary reason for RPF's opposition to the tribunal. See id.
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law. They see the importance of the tribunals in the footprints that they
make on the international law-making track and not in the substance of their
performance in addressing the particular abuses with which they are
charged. Theodor Meron, a leading exponent of the international criminal-
ization of internal atrocities has written, with regard to the Yugoslav and
Rwanda Tribunals, that:
No matter how many atrocities cases these international
tribunals may eventually try, their very existence sends a
powerful message. Their statutes, rules of procedure and
evidence, and practice stimulate the development of the
law. The possible fear by states that the activities of such
tribunals might preempt national prosecutions could also
have the beneficial effect of spurring prosecutions before
national courts for serious violations of humanitarian law. 30
There is little doubt that the establishment of the tribunals affords
the international community an opportunity to develop international law
with respect to atrocities. While that effect is salutary, it does little to re-
spond to the real and graphic abuses and suffering of the victims in Rwanda
and the former Yugoslavia. Laws are less meaningful if they cannot be
applied or enforced without prejudice to redress transgressions or unless
they have a deterrent effect such as behavior modification on the part of
would be perpetrators. As Meron correctly notes, the haphazard creation of
war crimes tribunals is selective and subject to the whims of states.
31
"What is needed," he categorically states, is "a uniform and definite corpus
of international humanitarian law that can be applied apolitically to internal
atrocities everywhere, and that recognizes the role of all states in the vindi-
cation of such law. '32 The ICC, when established, may be a significant step
in this direction. The enforcement of such law, however, is best accom-
plished by national courts although an international tribunal and a corpus of
international humanitarian law would illuminate this uncertain terrain. 33
The pitfall is that national courts may lack credibility with the group of
perpetrators being prosecuted, particularly if the group is ethnic, racial, or
religious, and sees itself as being persecuted by the victors. It may very
well be the case that such courts should be joint national and international
efforts, to alleviate the credibility problem.
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While the Yugoslav and Rwanda tribunals respond to the lawyer's
gradualist approach to institutional and normative development, thus far
they have failed to successfully address the basic purposes for which they
were established. They have been hampered by logistical, structural, and
political considerations. Their lofty mandates have been tempered by the
political contexts in which they were set and the climates in which they
operate.
The Rwanda Tribunal has met with a number of difficulties and has
not, as result, done much better than its Yugoslav counterpart. What should
be clear at the outset, however, is that the Rwanda Tribunal, no matter how
successful it becomes, will never compensate for the inaction of the interna-
tional community as the genocide took place in 1994. The tribunal was
established in November 1994 with investigative and prosecutorial units in
Kigali, and the appointment of Honore Rakotomanana, a retired chief jus-
tice from Madagascar as its the deputy prosecutor to serve under Richard
Goldstone. 34 But it was not until June 1995 that its judges were sworn in at
The Hague although the tribunal's seat was Arusha, Tanzania. 35 An admin-
istrator for the tribunal was not appointed until September 1995 .36 The
Rwanda Tribunal was given the same subject-matter jurisdiction as the Yu-
goslav Tribunal: genocide,37 crimes against humanity, 38 and violations of
article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol
11.39
34 LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUM. RTS., THE INT'L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER YuGo. 36 (1995).
35 Julian Bedford, Judges to Set Rules for Rwanda Genocide Tribunal, Reuters,
June 26, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, LEGNEW, ARCNWS File.
Judge Laity Kama of Senegal and Judge Yakov Ostrovsky of Russia were elected
president and vice-president of the tribunal respectively. See UN Panel Opens In-
quiry on Rwanda, N.Y TIMEs, June 28, 1995, at A5.
36 Andronico Adede, A Kenyan UN bureaucrat was appointed the tribunal's reg-
ister on September 12, 1995. See Kenyan Appointed to Top Job on War Crimes
Tribunal, Reuters, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
37 Rwanda Tribunal Statute, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., Annex, Art. 2,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), supra note 4.
38 Id. at Art. 3.
39 Id., Art. 4. Article 4 requires the tribunal to apply international humanitarian
law, particularly the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, for the Protection of
Victims of War, and the 1977 Second additional Protocol to the Geneva Conven-
tions. See Geneva Conventions, supra note 4. See also Second Protocol Additional
to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977).
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One year after it was established, the Rwanda Tribunal issued its
first indictments on December 12, 1995, accusing eight Rwandans of geno-
cide. 40 The Rwanda Tribunal, unlike its Yugoslav counterpart, has netted
several high-ranking officials of the former regime. As of February 2000,
the Tribunal was reported to have had in its custody 38 suspects, a number
of them senior officials of the previous regime, several of them thought to
be masterminds of the genocide. 41 Some of these included Col. Theoneste
Bagosora, a former permanent secretary in the Ministry of Defence, Col.
Anatole Nsengiyumva, head of the military intelligence, Ferdinand
Nahimana, head of the Rwanda Information Office and co-founder of Radio
Mille Collines which urged the genocide, and Andre Ntagerura, minister for
transport. 42 All three were extradited from Cameroon in January 1997. 41
The arrest of these prominent suspects was, however, overshad-
owed by the tribunal's financial and administrative difficulties. The tribu-
nal's first hearing was held in January 1997 amidst charges of corruption
and mismanagement." An investigation of the Rwanda Tribunal conducted
by the United Nations was highly critical of the entire effort, from the tribu-
nal itself to the United Nations offices in New York.45 The investigation
was requested by concerned member states, UN staff, and the UN Office of
Internal Oversight Services. 46 The report found that the tribunal's Registry
had no accounting system; that the tribunal had incomplete and unreliable
financial records; unqualified staff; disregard of UN regulations; shortage of
The inclusion of the Second Protocol was essential because the Rwandan conflict
was internal.
40 Akhavan, supra note 27, at 509.
41 Id. at 509; see also, Strange Justice, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 20, 1999, at 11.
42 See Rwanda: International News, Agence France Presse, Feb. 13, 1997, availa-
ble in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
43 See id.
44 See UN Court Hears Chilling Rwanda Genocide Testimony, Reuters North
American Wire, Jan. 10, 1997 available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File;
"Rwanda Tribunal Reopens in Tanzania, Then Closes," Inter Press Service, January
9, 1997.
45 United Nations, Report of the Secretary General on the Activities of the Office
of Internal Oversight Services, Financing of the International criminal Tribunal for
the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and
Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed
in the Territory of Neighboring States Between January 1 and December 31 1994
[hereinafter Report of Rwanda Tribunal], February 6, 1997.
46 Id., Annex (Summary).
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cells and courtrooms; lack of lawyers and investigators; lack of logistical,
transport, and office equipment; and neglect of the tribunal by UN head-
quarters in New York.47 In addition, the Office of the Prosecutor in Kigali
was riddled with operational difficulties and feuded openly with the Regis-
try in Arusha. 48 These problems together with lack of funding, the geo-
graphical separation of the Registry from the Prosecutor's Office, and poor
infrastructure have hindered the effective establishment of the tribunal and
its work.49
The investigative report, which concluded that the Rwanda Tribu-
nal was dysfunctional in virtually all areas, recommended, inter alia, that
the UN provide the tribunal with more administrative and financial support,
and that more guidance and cooperation with the Yugoslav Tribunal be
forged to improve its performance. 50 Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary Gen-
eral fired the registrar and the deputy prosecutor in February 1997 and re-
placed them with other UN officials.-"
By February 2000, the Tribunal had handed out seven genocide
convictions.5 2 Even with the cooperation of the Tutsi-led Rwanda govern-
ment, it is not feasible that a substantial number of the reported sixty-thou-
sand suspects in Rwandan jails will ever be tried by the tribunal. 53 From a
practical standpoint, many of the suspects will have to be tried by the na-
tional courts of Rwanda.
54
47 See generally id., 3-69. See also Craig Turner, Rwanda War Crimes Tribunal
Mismanaged, Report Says, Los ANGELES TIMES, Feb. 13, 1997, at 8; John Goshko,
UN Probe Find Mismanagement, Waste in Rwanda War Crimes Tribunal, WASH-
INGTON POST, Feb. 13, 1997, at A20.
48 See Report of Rwanda Tribunal, supra note 45.
49 Id.; see also UN Rwanda Tribunal Head defends His Record, Reuters North
American Wire, Jan. 11, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File
(Registrar Adede arguing that he had made some progress with few resources).
50 See Report of Rwanda Tribunal, supra note 45, 75-100.
51 See Kofi Annan Weighs Rwanda Tribunal Changes, UPI, Feb. 22, 1997, availa-
ble in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File; see also UN Chief Promises to Act on
Rwanda Tribunal Report, Agence France Presse, Feb. 13, 1997, available in
LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File; UN Chief Summons Top Court Officials
After Mismanagement Charges, Agence France Presse, Feb. 12, 1997 available in
LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
52 See Rwanda: the Musema Judgement Raises Questions at the International Tri-
bunal, AFRICA NEWS, Feb. 14, 2000, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS
File.
53 Akhavan, supra note 27, at 509.
54 Rwandan courts have started their own war crimes trials and had handed down
ten death sentences by February 1997. See Rwanda: International News, Agence
90 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 6
V. CONCLUSION
The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals are bad analogs for the Yugo-
slav and Rwanda Tribunals. While the former represented the calculated
revenge of the victors, they had little to do with justice per se, as a forum
for the victims to confront their victimizers and find guilt and levy punish-
ment. Instead, the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals culminated a war of the
titans: the Allies against the Axis, and the final closure, the entombment of
the aggressors. That is why, as Anderson states, the Allies were able in
Nuremberg to turn the ugly war into court proceedings about two-dozen
defendants, a crowning ceremony of their victory. As he writes:
[t]o reduce the world to a courtroom, to legal memoranda
and pleadings and paperwork, is possible only once an
army sits atop its vanquished enemy. Otherwise, the enor-
mity of the crimes left unaddressed out in the hills of Bos-
nia so dwarf those raised before the tribunal that it mocks
justice. A trial, Nuremberg taught, puts the symbolic seal
of justice on what armies have rectified with force.
55
From a distance, it is possible to see the Rwanda Tribunal as differ-
ent from the Yugoslav Tribunal and as an approximation of Nuremberg.
The temptation to equate the military defeat of the Hutu regime by the Tutsi
RPF and their removal from office with the Nazis is incorrect. Such anal-
ogy would only make sense if the targets of the Holocaust -- Jews - had
themselves defeated the Germans and taken control of the state. The war in
Rwanda is unfinished. The Hutu-Tutsi struggle for the control of the state
continues. The problem of Rwanda is rooted in the bipolarity of the state,
the gulf of history, power, and stereotype that divides the Hutu from the
Tutsi. Fundamentally, Rwanda is a dysfunctional state, hopelessly bound
for disaster. Unless the Tutsi RPF government organizes genuine demo-
cratic elections, which it would lose because Hutus would come back to
power, the prediction of at least one more cycle of violence is certain to be
fulfilled as Hutus, who make up ninety percent of the country, seek to re-
claim control. There is little doubt that it is in this context that the Rwanda
Tribunal is seen by Hutus: as international punishment by the victors, Tutsis
France Presse, Feb. 13, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
A Rwandan official estimated in 1994 that national courts could try as many as
30,000 suspects. See Despite UN Tribunal, Rwanda Plans to Try Suspects for War
Crimes, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Nov. 10, 1994, at A6.
55 Anderson, supra note 7, at 292.
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with the blessing and support of the United Nations.56 Tutsis may them-
selves see the tribunal and the war crimes they are conducting in Rwanda as
their opportunity for revenge.57 For that reason, the Rwanda Tribunal, since
it is not part of an overall political settlement of the Hutu-Tutsi struggle for
political power, is virtually irrelevant to the future of Rwanda. 58 One can
only hope that the ICC, once established, would draw valuable lessons from
prior international criminal tribunals.
56 Credibility of the Rwanda Tribunal is unlikely to materialize among Hutus be-
cause they are its main targets. The prosecution of Tutsis is essential for the tribu-
nal's legitimacy. In the case of the Yugoslav Tribunal, the prosecution of Bosnians
and Croats - and not just Serbs - would enhance that tribunal's legitimacy in the
eyes of perpetrators across the board.
57 It is interesting to note that the RPF government wanted the Rwanda Tribunal
situated in Rwanda so that it would teach the "Rwandese people a lesson, to fight
against the impunity to which it had become accustomed.. .and to promote national
reconciliation. See Akhavan, supra note 27, at 508. But this is only possible if the
tribunal enjoys some credibility with the perpetrators.
58 See Abbe David Lowell, Nurenberg in Rwanda: Not Enough, LEGAL TIMES,
Apr. 3, 1995, at 23-25.

